This study considers the influence of food sub-cultures within the food manufacturing environment and the adoption of food safety management practices. The influence of diversity within the overarching food safety culture of a food manufacturing operation is discussed through the use of case studies. Following a review of literature, four sub-cultures were proposed: executive, operations, engineering and technical/quality each with their own unique identity and modus operandi. Understanding the interaction of these within the visible and invisible elements of food safety culture is critical to prevent a food safety incident and associated recall.
Introduction
Whilst there is a body of academic work in the research areas of organizational management, organizational culture, types of leadership, and food safety management systems (FSMS), there is limited literature in the area of the degree of heterogeneity in food safety culture (FSC) in food manufacturing businesses. Culture is the "normative order, operating through informational and social influence that guides and constrains the behavior of people in collectives" (O'Reilly and Chatman 1996:160) . The term "culture" can be used to describe emergent history and traditions, and applies meaning to the underlying values and beliefs held by members of formal and informal social groupings (Buchann and Huczynski, 2004 cited by Griffith et al. 2010 ). There is a wide body of literature on business and FSC (including Wright et al. 2012 : Lee et al. 2012 Arendt et al. 2011; Griffith et al. 2010; Handy 1999; Hofstede 1997; O'Reilly and Chatman 1996; Falkenberg and Herremans 1995; Schein 1985) that considers the interplay of hierarchy, responsibility and level of organizational power, assumptions, behavioral and social norms, values, rules as well as the formal/informal or visible/invisible aspects of the subject.
The modus operandi of an individual food manufacturing organization will be unique with a distinct set of beliefs and values (Powell et al. 2011 ) that underpin the FSC. Griffith et al. (2010) suggest that critiquing and breaking FSC down into its component parts improves compliance with the FSMS and reduces the incidences of food safety problems. Further they argue it is important to consider that within a given FSC there could coexist subsets of values and attributes that are relatively stable and which may individually, or mutually, be resistant to change. Griffith (2014) describe organizational culture as an umbrella term under which multiple cultures may exist. This will be especially so where there is a tension between profitability and food safety and between the cost of implementing FSMS and the benefit that is determined as a result. Conflict in the prescribed aims and objectives of specific job roles (e.g. quality staff vs. production staff) or between senior management and other levels of management means that these multiple cultures not only exist, but may actually flourish. Factors such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance as proposed by Hofstede (1997) will also play a part. Griffith's FSC model (2014) is based on Schein's three concentric levels of culture: Level 1 -food safety climate: outermost layer of FSC detected during audits and inspections and is observable. This level of culture is modified depending on internal and external constraints e.g. lack of resources, people, presence of the auditor/inspector. Level 2 -underpinning culture: the middle layer includes the organization's espoused values (often unspoken) and guides the employees' behavior and attitudes to authority and legislation. As has been outlined, this underpinning culture can be made up of multiple subcultures. Depending on the depth of audit/inspection, this level of culture can be determined. Level 3 -core culture: the innermost layer that contains all the assumptions by staff of what the organization is all about which can be multiple and varied. The core culture includes core values that are invisible and often assumed. Depending on the depth and scope of the verification activity this level may remain hidden. This suggests that there are levels of culture that can be observed or assessed and that each level is distinct i.e. that FSC is heterogeneous. This is important to recognize when designing verification activities to determine compliance and effectiveness of FSMS and the influence of the organization's FSC. Given this theoretical background, and using case studies, this paper aims to consider the transactional and transformational elements of FSMS as well as the degree of heterogeneity of FSC in the manufacturing environment and its influence on performance. Two propositions will be considered:
Proposition 1: Different subcultures exist within a food company; and Proposition 2: The modus operandi of the subcultures can be rationalized and elements can be either congruent, or alternatively conflicting, at their interfaces.
Case Study 1: Evolving food safety regulation in Taiwan
Taiwan has an emerging food safety regulatory environment with new legislation introduced in 2014 as a result of historic incidents associated with plasticizer contamination and mislabeling of oils and rice (Ko, 2015) . In order for such legislation to be effective there has to be a commitment to implementing a FSMS and FSC within organizations and with ownership of the formal requirements at all levels. Ko's work considered the responses from 307 participants that worked in the food industry. 74% of participants identified that they were not satisfied with government management of food safety, but Ko observed that gender, work experience, type of firm, nature of supervision and source of knowledge had no net influence on those perceptions. However in terms of compliance with formal company requirements females were more likely to follow food safety practices, as were employees aged 51-60 or those with>16 years of work experience but the latter may just have been a factor of the amount of training received. This demonstrates there can be multiple factors that can either influence perceptions of formal requirements and/or lead to the creation of sub-cultures within an overarching FSC in an organization. Wu (2012:268) in a study on food safety control systems (FSCS) in Taiwanese international tourist hotels concluded that: "while most firms are willing to advance their food safety strategies if there are potential profits to be gained from the market, the intense price competition current in the market constrains firms from doing more than the regulatory framework requires." Thus FSC does not operate in isolation and whilst the underpinning culture interfaces with the organization's espoused values and guides the employees' behavior and attitudes to authority and legislation, an inner, and perhaps dissociated, core culture that in this case is driven by financial constraints can mediate and influence. Thus heterogeneity of values exists which in turn can drive differentiated behavior. Wu (2012) asserts that whilst regulatory controls drive the policy organizations must meet, it is the firm's capacity and senior management that have the major impact on food safety strategy implementation.
Food safety strategy
In order to assure that a FSMS is planned, developed, implemented, managed and verified effectively, aspects of FSC need to be drawn together in terms of: transactional elements such as: food safety agility (competence, environment, appropriateness of formal FSMS) and risk perception and mitigation (knowledge, training, awareness), or as Mintzberg would describe the operating system, and transformational elements including leadership and commitment (food safety as a business priority, organizational commitment and ownership of safety as an issue, employee involvement) communication (internal and external) and the external environment (see Mintzberg 1978) . Transformational food safety management engages all those who work for an organization, irrespective of job title, to consider their continued role in keeping the food that is produced safe. Transformational food safety management is about inspiring and empowering staff to feel food safety is important. Transactional FSMS focus on the policies, procedures and protocols, often called pre-requisites, that drive formal management of food safety and minimize risk with the associated penalties and sanctions in the event of process or product non-compliance. The people employed can be managed to be task focused in order to deliver ongoing compliance i.e. driven by job descriptions, work instructions, and specifications, but this approach lacks an understanding of how human behavior and mindset shapes the degree, and consistency, of compliance with such standards as described in case study 1.
External stakeholders can also prescribe the elements that the FSMS must encompass e.g. regulators, brand owners including retailers for whom food products are manufactured. The requirements for the structure of a FSMS are therefore driven by firstly regulatory compliance and secondly by compliance with private market standards and/or organizational standards where these contain additional requirements over and above legislation. These private (thirdparty) management standards include the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Standard for Food Safety (BRC, 2015) or BS EN ISO 22000:2005. This transactional approach ensures organizational systems, products and services comply with legislative requirements, and this in turn drives resource allocation based on cost and benefit analysis, and appropriateness of the implemented FSMS is driven through prescribed compliance audits and other verification activities. Therefore, there can be a heterogeneity of drivers from internal and external stakeholders that in themselves can act as sub-cultures within an overarching FSC.
Food safety strategy can be: planned through a highly organized and integrated process driven by the FSMS; adaptive where decision-makers are managing conflicting goals and bargaining between them to produce a stream of incremental, but disjointed decisions e.g. in the event of changing external environment, product or process failure; or entrepreneurial where a powerful leader is the decision-maker with his/her own vision of the organization's future (Mintzberg 1978) . Strategy can develop either as a result of a formulated approach or can be formed through a series of incremental decisions that have been made. Developing, implementing and continually improving FSMS requires the commitment of all employees in an organization for the process to be effective and efficient (Mensah and Julien 2011) . Their study suggests the challenges hindering compliance with FSMS as: transactional: financial especially the high cost of development and implementation, inappropriate infrastructural capabilities for validating and verifying FSMS, and lack of risk perception (awareness of the requirements) and transformational: people related issues including lack of technical knowledge and skill of employees as well as resistance to change. Mensah and Julien (2011) conclude that the biggest challenge to effective implementation of an FSMS is people related whether it is awareness, knowledge or education that creates a competency gap. Their study also determined that senior management commitment was the headline success factor in terms of leadership of food safety within an organization in that it is a primary objective of the organization to invest in the FSC by investing in their human capital i.e. the people that work for them. Lee et al. (2012) conclude that whilst transformational leadership did not directly impact employees' attitudes and intentions within a food business, it did significantly impact on organizational culture which in turn significantly impacted on employees' attitudes and intentions to follow safe food handling practices. Therefore whilst on the one hand transactional leadership (positional power) drives organizational compliance, if this approach is not embedded within elements of transformational leadership (personal power) the overall FSC will be weak. Griffith (2014) characterized transactional and transformational styles within a FSC at different levels of the organization i.e. senior management, middle management and supervisors and line leaders (Table 1) . This theme addresses the implementation of an overarching FSC at different levels of hierarchy within an organization, but the focus is very much on an integrated single FSC implemented in a cascade effect. Table 1   Table 1 highlights the integrated role of management levels in an organization in terms of delivering an effective and dynamic FSC. This approach relies on the active development and communication to all employees of a corporate vision emphasizing that food safety is the job of everyone not simply the focus of a few.
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Case Study 2: XL Foods Inc. Beef Recall 2012
The beef and beef products recall, the largest in Canadian history, started in September validation of procedures and equipment maintenance were found to be deficient. The HACCP system was not being regularly reviewed. These shortcomings were not formally identified by CFIA inspectors before the incident.
The enquiry concluded that:
"We found a relaxed attitude towards applying mandatory procedures -clearly outlined in some documents, less so in others. Again, a shortcoming shared by both plant and CFIA staff." (CFIA, 2013) This example again demonstrates the role of sub-cultures in terms of an overarching FSC with internal and external sub-cultures acting in juxtaposition to the formal and informal values and beliefs that can operate. A discordance at this interface can lead to a food safety breakdown and whilst there may be a transactional approach to FSMS within both sub-cultures there is a requirement for a transformational element of FSC in terms of the ongoing need to review, evolve and be adaptive especially when decision-makers are managing conflicting goals and bargaining between themselves. There are some elements of food safety management that are not negotiable and if there are as described by Mensah and Julien inappropriate infrastructural capacities as well as a lack of risk perception this may well lead to the type of food safety incident as seen at XL Foods Inc.
Food safety culture(s)
Compliance behavior is affected by the levels of awareness, education and training and individuals' or groups' resistance to change (Mensah and Julien 2011) . Dauber et al. (2012) consider that oversimplification of organizational models harms efforts to explore or explain cultural dynamics within organizations suggesting that sub-cultural groupings need to be considered. van Maanen (2008) propose that subcultures occur in all organizations and their interaction with each other is complex and ever changing based on social and personal identities. This concept of "social learning" is important when considering culture as it can create heterogeneity between sub-cultures and also allow dominant sub-cultures to evolve (Khatib 1996 including not only management levels, but also departmental constructs such as production, engineering, technical, sales, purchasing. This idea of social identity, subculture and insiders and outsiders is important in understanding how a collective and effective identity in terms of FSC is ensured. Thus, the literature would suggest there is both individual and group social identity within an organizational structure and these can be congruous or alternatively in conflict.
A sub-culture can be described as a culture that is separate from the dominant culture and exists in a department, work group, or geographical location and its identity includes the core values of the dominant culture plus additional values unique to its members (Khatib, 1996) . Tables 2 and 3 Indeed in an effort to drive efficiency and performance, functional sub-cultures will very often set different task orientated key performance indicators (KPI), which may or may not be mutually supportive and if not appropriately managed can lead to conflict that will impact on both the FSMS and FSC.
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Case Study 3: Maple Leaf Foods
In 2008, Canada experienced an outbreak of listeriosis that resulted in 22 deaths that was traced to contaminated ready-to-eat deli meats produced by Maple Leaf Foods, Canada's largest meat company and two hundred products were recalled. Maple Leaf Foods has a FSMS in place with associated monitoring and verification activities. At the time, as a result of these verification activities, there were positive tests for Listeria that was then followed by a sanitation intervention. However this pattern continued with positive results every 2-3 weeks and whilst the visible culture of the organization was assessed and actions undertaken, the invisible drivers of the FSMS continued. In parallel, Maple Leaf Food received increased orders for large packages of deli meats so to be able to meet these production demands, double shifts were implemented in the processing plants. Between midnight and before the start of morning shift, when the production lines were closed down, sanitation was carried out. The Weatherill Report (2009) reviewed that two meat slicers were implicated as being the source of contamination and due to the design of the equipment if full sanitization was required to deep clean the equipment it required the shutdown of the plant. The report concluded that there was insufficient time to clean and sanitize the machines adequately leading to the listeriosis outbreak (Manning et al. 2016 ).
Case Study 4: Peanut Corporation of America
In November 2008 a significant outbreak of Salmonella in Tennessee, US was linked to Peanut Corporation of America facilities that produced peanut butter and nine deaths and 714 confirmed cases of illness. The recall that was initiated led to the recall of nearly 4,000 peanut containing food products (Manning et al. 2016) . The investigations showed not only a total failure in terms of the implementation of a FSMS, but also poor implementation of food safety objectives at senior manager level. Members of the senior management, who have subsequently been incarcerated, made conscious decisions that negatively affected firstly many people individually, and also food companies that used products manufactured at PCA as an ingredient (Manning et al. 2016) . Further, there is no evidence of professional guidance being sought from regulators on how to deal appropriately with a "Positive" Salmonella result for a product that had been dispatched from the site. Instead, test results were ignored and contaminated products were sent to customers showing a clear lack of management level accountability. The lack of an effective FSC was apparent at PCA (Powell et al. 2011) . Further, while second-party audits at PCA were able to identify problems, the third party auditors did not (Powell et al. 2013 ). This questions the depth of the audits undertaken and if they had the capability to investigate situations where problems are not within the visible, formal culture and occur based on informal actions as a result of situational contingencies. Griffith et al. (2010) consider that cultural dynamics especially between sub-cultures could be due to varying subsets of beliefs and values many of which may be resistant to change.
Concurring with Hofstede (1997), Griffith et al. (2010) , propose that the culture elements of organizational power and hierarchy influence the perceived value of the contribution that individuals and thus sub-cultures make within the organization. This too can give risk to conflict between sub-cultures. Whilst the overall food safety climate may appear static, there may be fluidity within both the underpinning culture and the core culture elements at overall FSC level and also with each sub-culture. Indeed whilst one sub-culture can remain static, other subcultures in an organization can grow and develop further or conversely wither away (Handy, 1999) leading to a constant interpretation and reinterpretation of social relations (Iivari and Abrahamsson, 2002) . Schein (1996) concluded that considering overt behavior alone (the visible culture) would not decipher organizational culture because situational contingencies, such as those described in the case studies, often make individuals or groups behave in a manner that is inconsistent with their deeper values and assumptions. (b) Interacting with the dominant FSC but using informal methods that are outside the structure of the FSMS to achieve organizational objectives, or (c) Opposing the dominant FSC and the FSMS using formal or informal methods to achieve alternative objectives.
Situational contingencies and their influence on FSC
Situational theories of leadership suggest that specific leadership styles need to be matched to specific external circumstances (Sims et al. 2009 ) and that different situations require an alternative leadership approach in terms of being directive or empowering in order for a FSMS to be implemented effectively. This means that food safety strategy should include determining particular goals for specific situations and defining the associated leadership style that is required in a given situation (Adapted from Sims et a. 2009 ). However, positional power can exhibit itself within the organization as a driver for uniformity of behavior and control across functions. Transactional strength that exhibits itself as intransigence or inertia especially in a crisis or conflict situation can negatively impact on FSC and ultimately affect the ability of the organization to deliver consistently safe food in a constantly evolving regulatory and market environment.
The case studies used in this paper all demonstrate the pluralistic challenges at the interface of engineering, technical and operational cultures where each group has different and often competing KPI. Heterogeneity in strategic and operational KPI, especially when they are disseminated by function can create competition between organizational sub-cultures. Lone and Huffman (2014) assert that subsequent to the listeriosis incident, Maple Leaf Foods has had to approach food safety as a non-competitive issue and that food safety strategy must be deeply rooted in organisational values and management commitment across all functions. This demonstrates that food safety must be seen as an overarching cultural dynamic that all subcultures actively support and champion. This study has considered the interaction between four types of sub-cultures within a food manufacturing organization in order to develop a conceptual framework of FSC as a whole, with regard to formal and informal cultural interactions and its influence on the effectiveness of the FSMS (Figure 1 ).
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Whilst the sub-cultures themselves do not appear in the framework, the leadership of the executive sub-culture in terms of senior management commitment, and ensuring channels of communication are crucial to centering the transactional elements of the FSMS, as well as the transformational characteristics that need to be in place. There are both visible and invisible elements of the FSMS and some factors such as risk perception and resource availability span both transactional and transformational aspects. The attributes, values and norms of the FSC and interfacing sub-cultures can be both formal and informal and factors such as power culture, positive and negative heroes, technical knowledge and skillset will all influence the effectiveness of the FSMS. Core transactional culture factors will characterize the transactional FSMS in terms of the degree of equality, uncertainty and individuality that is formally prescribed, and also informally enacted. Therefore it is important to understand the multi-level dynamics that influence the FSMS will be unique to each food manufacturing organization and also to the situational challenges that each business can encounter. Two propositions have been considered in this paper and it has been shown within the theory explored that:
Proposition 1: Different subcultures exist within a food company; and also Proposition 2: The modus operandi of the subcultures can be rationalized and elements can be either congruent, or alternatively conflicting, at their interfaces.
What are the implications for academics and for industry practitioners? Effective FSC requires leadership at all levels of the organization ( Table 1 ) that encompasses both transactional and transformational elements. Leadership and ownership sit at the heart of an organization consistently producing safe and legal food, whilst still being able to adapt to market and regulatory shocks and drivers. Essential within this leadership process, as has been shown in all four case studies, is a need for effective product and process verification and, as has been demonstrated too in the case studies, an appropriate and timely response in the event of non-compliance. This requires both personal and organizational leadership. With regard to the further development of literature in this field, more research needs to be undertaken to firstly differentiate the modus operandi of different sub-cultures within an overarching food safety subculture and secondly critique the dynamics at the interface of subcultures specifically the situation of embedded regulatory inspectors and plant staff (as shown with the XL Foods Inc.
case study), and the interface between functional subcultures (see Table 2 ) such as the executive and the other three sub-cultures (as demonstrated with the Peanut Corporation of America case study). Whilst Table 3 draws together the cultural assumption and operational norms of different functional subcultures, in reality this interaction is probably more nuanced and may well be sector specific. For example, it could be postulated that the high throughput/low margin production environment has a different cultural and operational norm dynamic to the low throughput/high margin situation. Indeed, in practice each organization will have a unique interrelationship between the formal and informal; the visible and invisible; and the transactional and transformational elements of their FSMS and FSC. Undertaking further industry based research in order to develop practical tools that help organizations to assess and benchmark themselves, recognize vulnerabilities and thus implement appropriate preventive action would certainly prove of value.
Discussion
Whilst Executives focus on financial survival and growth to ensure returns to shareholders and to society.
The economic environment is perpetually competitive and potentially hostile, so the CEO is isolated and alone, yet appears omniscient, in total control, and feels indispensable (autocratic approach).
Executives cannot get reliable data from subordinates so they must trust their own judgment.
Organization and management are intrinsically hierarchical; the hierarchy is the measure of status and success and the primary means of maintaining control. The organization must be a team, but accountability has to be individual.
The willingness to experiment and take risks extends only to those things that permit the executive to stay in control.
As the organization is very large, it becomes depersonalized and abstract and, therefore, has to be run by rules, routines (systems), and rituals (bureaucracy approach).
The inherent value of relationships and community is lost as an executive rises in the hierarchy. The attraction of the job is the challenge, the high level of responsibility, and the sense of accomplishment (not the relationships).
The ideal world is one in which the organization performs like a well-oiled machine, focusing on pivotal values, needing only occasional maintenance and repair.
People are a necessary evil, not an intrinsic value. The well-oiled organization does not need people, only activities that are contracted for.
Situational leadership may be delegated to other sub-cultures. Requirement is to advise executive body on problems solved not for the executive body to become an element of organizational compliance management.
The success of the enterprise depends on people's knowledge, skill, learning ability, and commitment.
The required knowledge and skill are "local" and based on the organization's core technology.
No matter how carefully engineered the production process is or how carefully rules and routines are specified, operators must have the capacity to learn and to deal with surprises, and have situational understanding and leadership.
Most operations involve interdependencies between separate elements of the process; hence, operators must be able to work as a collaborative team in which communication, openness, mutual trust, and commitment are highly valued.
Need to collaborate with other subcultures in order to deliver food safety compliance.
Engineers are proactively optimistic that they can and should master nature.
Engineers are stimulated by puzzles and problems and are pragmatic perfectionists who prefer "people free" solutions.
The ideal world is one of elegant machines and processes working in perfect precision and harmony without human intervention.
Engineers are safety oriented and overdesign for safety.
Engineers prefer linear, simple cause-and-effect, quantitative thinking to deliver solutions rather than qualitative cultural values and beliefs based solutions.
The assurance of food safety is about ensuring systems are developed that comply with legislative requirements transactional. Safety is binary (unsafe or safe).
The food safety management systems must comply with third party standards (transactional). Safety is binary (unsafe or safe).
The Technical/Quality team oversee the implementation of verification systems to assess food safety compliance and implement sanctions in the event of non-compliance. This activity has transactional and transformational elements.
The operations and engineering departments should also "own" food safety and it is their responsibility to implement the policies, procedures and programs that have been developed by the organization.
The Technical/Quality team should lead by example in ensuring that food safety if necessary takes precedence over productivity. 
